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tion of statutory construction, the logical flaws in the opinion are
unlikely to have serious adverse consequences. By referring to
"accident" and the accrual of the "main claim" interchangeably, 21 7
however, the Court has left unclear which event should be considered in determining whether the 1976 amendment is applicable.
This distinction would be significant, for example, in wrongful
death cases where the accident occurs prior to August 1, 1976, but
the death occurs thereafter. The problem arises because the time of
the accident has no significance in the cause of action for wrongful
death, which accrues when an administrator is appointed to represent the interests of the decedent's distributees.218 In cases where the
death occurs after August 1, 1976, it is submitted, the Court would
have little alternative but to hold that the amendment to section
167(3) requires an insurer to defend and indemnify an impleaded
spouse. Even under the Mandels rationale, it would seem difficult
for the Court to find that the date of the underlying accident rather
than the accrual date of the main claim controls, since the amendment, by its terms, applies to "causes of action" arising on or after
its effective date. Thus, were the Court to hold that the accident
date controls, it would have to do so on the unlikely ground that a
wrongful death claim "arises" when underlying tortious conduct
occurred.
Frank K. Walsh

JUDICIARY LAW

Judiciary Law § 90(4): Conviction of any federal felony compels
automatic disbarment
Section 90(4) of the Judiciary Law mandates automatic disbarment of an attorney who has been convicted of a felony. 29 Traditionally, the courts limited this statute to instances in which the
id. at 458, 382 N.E.2d at 764, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 64.
EPTL § 5-4.1 (1967); D. SIEGEL, NEW YoRK PRACTICE § 44 (1978).
N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(4) (McKinney 1968) provides in pertinent part: "Any ...

217See

211See

2I

ney ...

convicted of a felony, shall, upon such conviction, cease to be an attorney ...

attoror to

be competent to practice law as such." Under § 90(4), an attorney convicted of a felony is
ipso facto disbarred without further judicial proceedings. In re Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153, 156,
351 N.E.2d 743, 745, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96 (1976); In re Barash, 20 N.Y.2d 154, 157, 228 N.E.2d
896, 898, 281 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000 (1967); In re Ginsburg, 1 N.Y.2d 144, 147, 134 N.E.2d 193,
194, 151 N.Y.S.2d 361, 362 (1956). Section 90(4) further provides that upon presentation of a
certified or exemplified copy of the judgment of conviction, the appellate division will order
the attorney's name struck from the rolls. N.Y. Jun. LAw § 90(4) (McKinney 1968).
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crime was a New York felony, or a federal felony for which there was
an equivalent felony under New York Law. 220 The Court of Appeals
departed from this interpretation in In re Chu,22' holding that automatic disbarment would result from a federal felony conviction despite the absence of a "precisely matching [New York] felony statute. '222 Recently, in In re Thies, 2 23 the Court of Appeals, reaffirming
22 In re Donegan, 282 N.Y. 285, 292, 26 N.E.2d 260, 262 (1940). Donegan was convicted
of conspiracy to use the mails to defraud, a felony under federal law but a misdemeanor under
New York State Law. Pursuant to Ch. 946, [1895] N.Y. Laws, (current version at N.Y. JuD.
LAW § 90(4) (1968), the Appellate Division, First Department, struck Donegan's name from
the roll of attorneys. 282 N.Y. at 287-88, 26 N.E.2d at 261. On appeal, the sole issue before
the Court of Appeals was "whether the term 'felony,' as employed in [§ 88(3)] of the
Judiciary Law . . . includes an offense defined as a felony by Federal statute, which, if
cognizable under the laws of New York, would at most be a misdemeanor ... "Id. at 28889, 26 N.E.2d at 261. The Court held that the term "felony," as employed in the statute,
included only federal felonies which were also felonies under the laws of New York. Id. at 29091, 26 N.E.2d at 262. In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned that if the statute
encompassed all federal felonies, an attorney might be automatically disbarred for a conviction of a federal felony which, if punishable only as a misdemeanor under New York law,
would entitle him to a hearing and result in less severe discipline. Id. at 291, 26 N.E.2d at
262; see N.Y. Jun. LAW § 90(2), (6) (McKinney 1968 & Supp. 1978-1979). The Court further
noted that automatic disbarment is, in effect, a punishment, and therefore the statute, being
penal in nature, must be strictly construed. Id. at 292, 26 N.E.2d at 263.
Donegan, however, was a departure from the practice previously followed in the appellate
division which had mandated disbarment upon conviction of any federal or New York felony.
See, e.g., In re Hess, 250 App. Div. 581, 295 N.Y.S. 82 (1st Dep't 1937) (per curiam); In re
Hodgskin, 193 App. Div. 217, 183 N.Y.S. 401 (1st Dep't 1920) (per curiam).
From 1940 until 1977, when the Court of Appeals decided In re Chu, 42 N.Y.2d 490, 49394, 369 N.E.2d 1, 3, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1003 (1977), the determination in Donegan remained
the rule in New York. For cases decided under the Donegan rule, see In re Levy, 37 N.Y.2d
279, 333 N.E.2d 350, 372 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1975) (per curiam); In re Cristenfeld, 58 App. Div. 2d
505, 397 N.Y.S.2d 101 (2d Dep't 1977) (per curiam); In re Kilcullen, 55 App. Div. 2d 437,
391 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1st Dep't 1977) (per curiam).
1i42 N.Y.2d 490, 369 N.E.2d 1, 398 N.Y.S.2d 1001 (1977).
222Id. at 494, 369 N.E.2d at 3, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. In Chu, an attorney was convicted
of knowingly filing false documents with the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a
felony under federal law. Id. at 491, 369 N.E.2d at 1, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1001-02. Cognizant of
a New York statute making it a felony to offer a false instrument for filing, the New York
Bar Association initiated a proceeding in the appellate division to strike the defendant's name
from the rolls. Id. at 491-92, 369 N.E.2d at 2, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1002. The appellate division
refused to grant the order to strike on the ground that the federal crime was not recognized
as a felony in New York. Id. at 492, 369 N.E.2d at 2, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1002. In particular, the
intermediate appellate court noted that New York's statute requires an intent to defraud the
state or any political subdivision thereof, but that in this case, the fraud was practiced on a
federal agency. Id. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a conviction for conduct
punishable as a felony under federal law is a sufficient basis for automatic disbarment under
§ 90(4) of the Judiciary Law. Id. at 493, 369 N.E.2d at 3, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1003. The Court
also noted that the federal and New York statutes were sufficiently analogous to justify the
sanctions of § 90(4). Id. at 494, 369 N.E.2d at 3, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1003.
Judge Wachtler, in a concurring opinion in which Judges Fuchsberg and Cooke joined,
expressed concern over the scope of the majority's opinion. While agreeing with the majority
that the substantive federal and state provisions in the case were so similar as to bring the
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Chu, held that a federal felony conviction results in automatic disbarment without regard to whether the conduct is punishable as a
felony in New York."
In Thies, the appellant was convicted in federal district court
of assault on a federal officer.2ss Pursuant to section 90(4) of the
Judiciary Law, the Joint Bar Association Grievance Committee for
the Second and Eleventh Judicial Districts sought an order striking
Thies' name from the rolls of attorneys. The Appellate Division,
Second Department, granted the order226 and Thies appealed, conof the offense should
tending that a hearing on the circumstances
2
have been held prior to his disbarment.

1

In a per curiam opinion, a closely divided Court of Appeals 22s
affirmed the appellate division's order. 229 Citing Chu, the Court reaffirmed its position that section 90(4) mandates automatic disbarment when an attorney is convicted of any crime "judged by the
Congress to be of such seriousness and so offensive to the community as to merit punishment as a felony. ' 23 " Thus, the Court
concluded that consideration should not be given to mitigating circumstances or to the severity of the crime. 231 Additionally, the Court
rejected Thies' claim that the application of section 90(4) to federal
of New York violates
felonies which are not felonies under the laws
2
the eighth and fourteenth amendments.23

federal statute within the scope of § 90(4), Judge Wachtler "assume[d] that the majority
did not intend to imply that all felony convictions in Federal courts would necessarily dictate
the same result." Id. at 495, 369 N.E. 2d at 4, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1004. (Wachtler, J., concurring).
= 45 N.Y.2d 865, 382 N.E.2d 1351, 410 N.Y.S.2d 575 (1978) (per curiam), remittur
amended, 45 N.Y.2d 924, 383 N.E.2d 877, 411 N.Y.S.2d 231 (1978), aff'g 61 App. Div. 2d 1037,
403 N.Y.S.2d 53 (2d Dep't), appealfiled, No. 78-1405, 47 U.S.L.W. 3637 (March 27, 1979).
22 45 N.Y.2d at 866-67, 382 N.E.2d at 1351, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
2 See Court of Appeals Stands Fast On Disbarment of All Felons, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20,
1978 at 1, col. 2. The federal district court judge admitted the altercation "was at least partly
engendered by governmental ineptitude." Id. at 4, col. 3. Moreover, he questioned the New
York authorities for permitting this incident to be grounds for disbarment. Id.
m 61 App. Div. 2d at 1037, 403 N.Y.S.2d at 53-54.
21 Court of Appeals Stands Fast On Disbarment of All Felons, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 20, 1978,
at 1, cols. 2, 3. Thies' claim was apparently predicated on § 90(6) of the Judiciary Law which
grants an attorney who is guilty of a crime that does not result in automatic disbarment
under § 90(4) the right to be heard in his own defense before his is subjected to discipline.
See N.Y. JuD. LAW § 90(6) (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979).
2 Chief Judge Breitel and Judges Jasen, Gabrielli and Jones concurred in the per curiam
opinion, while Judges Wachtler, Fuchsberg and Cooke dissented in a memorandum opinion.
21145 N.Y.2d at 866, 382 N.E.2d at 1352, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
2" Id. at 866-67, 382 N.E.2d at 1351, 410 N:Y.S.2d at 576 (quoting In re Chu, 42 N.Y.2d
at 494, 369 N.E.2d at 3, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1003 (1977)); see note 221 and accompanying text
supra.
21145 N.Y.2d at 866, 382 N.E.2d at 1351, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 576.
="45 N.Y.2d 924, 925, 383 N.E.2d 877, 411 N.Y.S.2d 231.
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In contrast, the dissent objected to the establishment of a "per
se" rule which mandates summary disbarment for conviction of a
felony in anqther jurisdiction, without regard to whether the offense
is punishabl6 as a felony in New York.

3

Maintaining that discipline

may be attained "without sacrificing fairness and reason,''2 the
dissent objected to the majority's rule which precludes an evaluation of the seriousness of the offense. The dissent concluded that
only a statutory change could avoid the unduly harsh consequences
of the majority's decision. 5
Section 90(4) is designed to protect the public from those who
are unfit to practice law23s and to maintain public confidence in the
m Id. at 867, 382 N.E.2d at 1352, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 577 (Wachtler, Fuchsberg, & Cooke,
JJ., dissenting).
Id. The dissenting opinion is substantially similar to Judge Wachtler's concurring
opinion in In re Chu in which Judges Fuchsberg and Cooke joined. See 42 N.Y.2d at 495, 369
N.E.2d at 4, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1004 (Wachtler, J., concurring); note 221 supra. In Chu, Judge
Wachtler expressed concern with an overly broad interpretation of the majority's decision
because certain federal felony convictions may not be sufficiently severe to warrant automatic
disbarment. 42 N.Y.2d at 495, 369 N.E.2d at 4, 398 N.Y.S.2d at 1004 (Wachtler, J., concurring).
231 Id. It appears that the statutory change advanced by the dissent was intended only
to avoid the "inflexibly harsh" rule of the instant case and was not meant to abolish automatic disbarment when a federal felony is cognizable as a felony under New York law. See
id.
Subsequent to Thies, the severity of New York's disbarment provisions was partially
mitigated by an amendment to § 90(5) of the Judiciary Law. N.Y. JUD. LAW § 90(5) (McKinney Interim Annotation Service Feb. 1979). The amendment grants the appellate division
discretionary power to readmit a disbarred attorney if he has not been convicted of a crime
during the seven year period following disbarment. Id. Prior to the amendment, disbarment
was irrevocable unless the attorney obtained either a presidential or gubernatorial pardon or
a reversal of the conviction for which he was disbarred. See In re Sugarman, 64 App. Div. 2d
166, 409 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1st Dep't 1978) (per curiam); In re Glucksman, 57 App. Div. 2d 205,
394 N.Y.S.2d 191 (1st Dep't 1977) (per curiam); ch. 946, [1895] N.Y. Laws 1. Although the
amendment increased the grounds on which a disbarred attorney may seek readmission, it
did not alter the rule that mere compliance with the criteria set forth in the statute does
not automatically entitle him to reinstatement. N.Y. Jut. LAw § 90(5) (1975), as amended
by Ch.782, § 1, [1978] N.Y. LAWS 54. See also the memorandum attached to N.Y.S. 6065,
201st Sess. (1978), enacted as § 90(5) as amended, in which Senator Caemerer, who sponsored
the bill stated: "Readmission to the practice of law is discretionary at present and would
remain so." To obtain reinstatement, an attorney must petition for a hearing during which
he must prove his fitness to practice law by a preponderance of the evidence. See In re Barash,
20 N.Y.2d 154, 228 N.E.2d 896, 281 N.Y.S.2d 997 (1967); In re Kaufmann, 245 N.Y. 423, 157
N.E. 730 (1927); cf. Toro v. Malcolm, 44 N.Y.2d 146, 375 N.E.2d 739, 404 N.Y.S.2d 558 (1978)
(subsequent reversal of conviction does not automatically restore correction officer to his
position or entitle him to back pay.)
21 See In re Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153, 156, 351 N.E.2d 743, 745, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95, 97
(1976); In re Levy, 37 N.Y.2d 279, 282, 333 N.E.2d 350, 352, 372 N.Y.S.2d 41, 44 (1975) (per
curiam); In re Kahn, 38 App. Div. 2d 115, 124, 328 N.Y.S.2d 87, 96 (1st Dep't) (per curiam),
aff'd, 31 N.Y.2d 752, 290 N.E.2d 435, 338 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1972) (mem.); cf. Ex parte Wall,
107 U.S. 265, 273 (1882) (disciplinary proceedings not intended to punish attorney but to
protect public from persons unfit to practice law).
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integrity of attorneys and the legal system. 23 As such, the statute
is concerned not only with the conduct underlying a felony, but also
with the public's perception of a legal system which would permit
a convicted felon to remain an attorney. Although the Thies Court's
rationale adequately considers the need to maintain the integrity of
the profession in the eyes of the public, its decision to allow disbarment without regard to the affect of an attorney's conduct on his
2
fitness to practice lawns may cause unjust results.ns
The same unfairness that results in the Thies situation also
may obtain when an attorney is convicted of committing a New
York felony. 2 ° It is clear that by predicating disbarment upon conviction of any felony, the legislature has failed to distinguish between conduct which per se renders an attorney unfit to practice 24'
2 See In re Mitchell, 40 N.Y.2d 153, 156-57, 351 N.E.2d 743, 745-46, 386 N.Y.S.2d 95,
97 (1976); In re Kahn, 38 App. Div. 2d 115, 124, 328 N.Y.S.2d 87, 96 (1st Dep't) (per curiam),
affl'd, 31 N.Y.2d 752, 290 N.E.2d 435, 338 N.Y.S.2d 434 (1972) (mem.); In re Glassman, 19
App. Div. 2d 146, 146, 241 N.Y.S.2d 468, 469 (1st Dep't 1963).
218Under the Court's ruling, an attorney would be automatically disbarred for crimes
which do not directly reflect an unfitness to practice law. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1243 (1976)
(carrying a switchblade on an Indian reservation); 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1976) (uttering indecent
language on the radio); 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1976) (defacing a coin made at United States mint).
2" See 45 N.Y.2d at 867, 382 N.E.2d at 1352, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 577 (Wachtler, Fuchsberg
and Cooke, JJ., dissenting); Bonomi, Automatic Disbarment-Amendment or Repeal,
N.Y.L.J., Jan. 12, 1979, at 1, col. 1, at 2, col. 1. Recently, the Senate Judiciary Committee
approved a bill to amend § 90(4) which would overturn the Chu rule. The bill, N.Y.S. 3028,
201st Sess. (1978), would allow automatic disbarment only if the felony of which an attorney
is convicted in another jurisdiction is also a felony in New York. Additionally, the proposed
amendment would permit attorneys disbarred for convictions of felonies in federal and other
state courts which do not constitute felonies in New York to apply for reinstatement. See
State Senate JudiciaryPanel Backs Revision of "Chu" Rule, N.Y.L.J., March 21, 1979, at 1,
col. 2, at 30, col. 2.
214Section 90(4) mandates that an attorney who has been convicted of criminally negligent homicide, N.Y. PmAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 1975), or possession of more than 8
ounces of marijuana, id. § 221.20 (McKinney Supp. 1978-79), is summarily disbarred without
an opportunity to offer evidence in mitigation. Whether such conduct is indicative of an
unfitness to practice law per se is doubtful.
241A list of the types of conduct which per se manifests unfitness to practice may be
found in the ABA Model Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement. See ABA Standing Committee
on Professional Discipline, Suggested Guidelines for Rules of DisciplinaryEnforcement 13
(1977). The guidelines include interference with the administration of justice, false swearing,
misrepresentation, fraud, willful failure to file income tax returns, deceit, bribery, extortion,
misappropriation or an attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit any of these as crimes
which render an attorney unfit to practice. Since the purposes of § 90(4) require that the
public be protected from attorneys with serious character defects, crimes of moral turpitude
such as murder and arson also appear to be appropriate bases for automatic disbarment. With
regard to sanctions, the ABA recommends that an attorney convicted of any crime be afforded a hearing into the seriousness of the conduct and mitigating circumstances. Automatic
suspension pending a hearing, however, is required when an attorney is convicted of a "serious
crime". See id.
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and conduct
which is not directly related to his competence as an
22
attorney. 1
It is suggested that the legislature should amend section 90(4)
so that consideration is given to the dual purposes of the statute.
This may be accomplished by a rule which provides for automatic
disbarment only when an attorney is guilty of conduct which justifies a conclusive presumption of unfitness to practice law. For all
other convictions, automatic suspension pending a disciplinary
hearing should be imposed to insure adequate protection of the
public and fairness to the attorney. The determination whether the
attorney's conduct merits disbarment, suspension or reprimand can
be made at the hearing by examining the seriousness of the crime
and any mitigating circumstances.243
Adoption of this proposal would not diminish public confidence
in the legal system, since automatic disbarment would still be imposed for crimes which evince a serious character defect or lack of
integrity. Although it may be argued that the dual purposes of section 90(4) may be accomplished most effectively through summary
disbarment for all felonies, it is submitted that, by adding a measure of flexibility, the legislature would provide a procedure which
promotes "firm discipline
244
son.

.

.

without sacrificing fairness and reaJohn R. Calcagni

212See
21

note 240 supra.

The ABA has recommended a proposal providing for automatic suspension of an

attorney convicted of a "serious crime" until a disciplinary hearing is held. Following the

hearing, a court may enter an order either suspending or disbarring the attorney depending
on the gravity of the crime and any mitigating circumstances. ABA Standing Committee on
Professional Discipline, Suggested Guidelines for Rules of Disciplinary Enforcement 14
(1977). The principal distinction between the ABA proposal and the proposal suggested
herein is that the ABA recommendation does not provide for summary disbarment even where
the conduct engaged in by an attorney directly affects his fitness to practice law. See id.
" See 45 N.Y.2d at 867, 382 N.E.2d at 1352, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 577 (Wachtler, Fuchsberg,
& Cooke, JJ., dissenting). It should be noted that only seven other states provide for automatic disbarment. See ALA. CODE tit. 34, § 3-86 (1977) (any felony except manslaughter and
any crime involving moral turpitude); ARIz. REV. STAT. § 32-273 (1976); ARiz. SuP. CT. R.
29(c)-(d) (1973 & Supp. 1978) (any felony); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 454.18 (West 1965) (any
"infamous crime"); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-501 (1973) (any crime involving "moral turpitude");
Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-3-41 (1972) (any felony except manslaughter); TEX. CIv. CODE ANN.
tit. 320a-1, § 6 (Vernon 1973) (any felony involving "moral turpitude" or any misdemeanor
involving theft, embezzlement or fraudulent appropriation of money or other property where
probation has not been given or has been revoked); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-51-37 (1977) (any
felony or misdemeanor involving "moral turpitude").

